Did you read the dissent? The opinions are here (PDF). "Clear and present danger" isn't the relevant legal test. It's not a prior restraint case, so it's not about who has "the right to say something", but "the right to not have to compensate the victim of harm you've intentionally caused". And the argument has nothing to do with whether or not the WBC's speech is "tasteless".
Essentially, I agree with Alito:
1. I don't think that all harm caused by speech should be completely shielded from civil law by the First Amendment. US law regarding intentional infliction of emotional distress torts is already quite exacting (as Alito describes).
2. I think the WBC's speech in this case mixed a vicious personal attack on the Snyders with (equally abhorrent but constitutionally protected) speech on issues of public concern. The correct metaphor is as follows (to quote Alito quoting Justice Beryer):
"[S]uppose that A were physically to assault B, knowing that the assault (being newsworthy) would provide A with an opportunity to transmit to the public his views on a matter of public concern. The constitutionally protected nature of the end would not shield A's use of unlawful, unprotected means. And in some circumstances the use of certain words as means would be similarly unprotected."
(Breyer's concurring opinion essentially agrees with Alito's, except Breyer thinks that Sneyder specifically doesn't meet the standard of an IIED claim because he didn't see the WBC's signs until after the funeral. Which I think is irrelevant, that has nothing to do with the extent of the harm caused or whether that harm was caused intentionally.)
no subject
Essentially, I agree with Alito:
1. I don't think that all harm caused by speech should be completely shielded from civil law by the First Amendment. US law regarding intentional infliction of emotional distress torts is already quite exacting (as Alito describes).
2. I think the WBC's speech in this case mixed a vicious personal attack on the Snyders with (equally abhorrent but constitutionally protected) speech on issues of public concern. The correct metaphor is as follows (to quote Alito quoting Justice Beryer):
"[S]uppose that A were physically to assault B, knowing that the assault (being newsworthy) would provide A with an opportunity to transmit to the public his views on a matter of public concern. The constitutionally protected nature of the end would not shield A's use of unlawful, unprotected means. And in some circumstances the use of certain words as means would be similarly unprotected."
(Breyer's concurring opinion essentially agrees with Alito's, except Breyer thinks that Sneyder specifically doesn't meet the standard of an IIED claim because he didn't see the WBC's signs until after the funeral. Which I think is irrelevant, that has nothing to do with the extent of the harm caused or whether that harm was caused intentionally.)