There are a few stories I've really wanted to comment on that I haven't gotten around to, so time for a post while I still have a moment to write.
( Long post below )
( Long post below )
[...] declaring the compatibility of state or federal laws with the Constitution is not only not the "primary role" of this Court, it is not a separate, free standing role at all. We perform that role incidentally—by accident, as it were—when that is necessary to resolve the dispute before us. Then, and only then, does it become "'the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.'" That is why, in 1793, we politely declined the Washington Administration's request to "say what the law is" on a particular treaty matter that was not the subject of a concrete legal controversy. 3 Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay 486–489 (H. Johnston ed. 1893). And that is why, as our opinions have said, some questions of law will never be presented to this Court, because there will never be anyone with standing to bring a lawsuit.(Would be an interesting exercise for law students to actually attempt this "scavenger hunt". Did Scalia do so for this case?)
[...]
Windsor's injury was cured by the judgment in her favor. And while, in ordinary circumstances, the United States is injured by a directive to pay a tax refund, this suit is far from ordinary. Whatever injury the United States has suffered will surely not be redressed by the action that it, as a litigant, asks us to take. The final sentence of the Solicitor General's brief on the merits reads: "For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed." Brief for United States (merits) 54 (emphasis added [by Scalia]). That will not cure the Government’s injury, but carve it into stone. One could spend many fruitless afternoons ransacking our library for any other petitioner's brief seeking an affirmance of the judgment against it.
Justice Elena Kagan, whom President Barack Obama appointed to the bench, closely questioned attorney Paul Clement, who was defending the law, about whether DOMA was passed with the specific intent to discriminate against an unpopular minority group. Kagan said anytime a law targets a group of people "that is not everybody's favorite group in the world" it raises a red flag that Congress' judgment was "infected by dislike, by fear, by animus."And this is the lawyer defending DOMA!
Clement refuted that, saying the federal government was forced to take action in 1996 because for the first time, it appeared possible that a state would allow same-sex couples to wed. If a few states allowed same-sex marriage and the others did not, Clement said it would create confusion at the federal level as to how to apply the more than 1,000 laws and statutes that affect married couples.
Kagan interrupted. "Well, is what happened in 1996—and I'm going to quote from the House report here—is that 'Congress decided to reflect and honor a collective moral judgment and to express moral disapproval of homosexuality.' Is that what happened in 1996?"
Kagan's question provoked a few gasps and laughter in the courtroom, but Clement was not caught off guard. "Does the House report say that? Of course, the House report says that. And if that's enough to invalidate the statute, then you should invalidate the statute," Clement said.
The means of "rebuking" matters. Justice Stevens in Carey v. Population Services:(If rebuking the judiciary is a rational basis (as pointed out by another commenter), the test is pretty meaningless, since it now means only that a discriminatory law has to be passed twice.)
Although the State may properly perform a teaching function, it seems to me that an attempt to persuade by inflicting harm on the listener is an unacceptable means of conveying a message that is otherwise legitimate.